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Dialogue with Kierkegaard in Protestant Theology: Donald Bloesch, Francis Schaeffer, and Helmut Thielicke
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Twentieth century Protestant theology effectively began in 1919 with the publication of Karl Barth’s great Roman’s Commentary. Here Barth effectively declared the otherness of God and the crisis of modern optimistic religion and culture, and Barth did this under the influence of Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaardian phrases like “the infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity” echo throughout Barth’s early works, and these themes are an important part of what makes twentieth century theology so different from nineteenth century theology. In his later works Barth did not make so many references to the idiosyncratic Dane, but dialogue with Kierkegaard had begun and was to become a fascinating and many-sided element in the writings of many Protestant theologians after Barth. And this dialogue with Kierkegaard can serve as a kind of red thread that can lead us into some of the distinctive and interesting themes of the theology of the last century.

Three theologians of the generation after Barth who carried on extensive dialogues with Kierkegaard were Donald Bloesch, Francis Schaeffer, and Helmut Thielicke. The three represent a variety of intellectual, confessional, and national backgrounds, yet the three have some important things in common. All three saw themselves as followers of the Protestant Reformation, and all three, like Barth, saw a very close connection between theology and Christian preaching. And all three thought the dialogue with Kierkegaard was significant. But there the similarity ends. Each theologian has a distinctive interpretation of and response to our Danish friend.

Donald Bloesch

Donald Bloesch is an American, though he did much of his post doctoral study internationally, at Oxford, Tuebingen, and Basel. He regards himself as a follower of Karl Barth, Jacques Ellul, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, though Barth is especially important to him. He likes to call himself “evangelical” and generally aligns more with Reformed than Lutheran points of view. In his interaction with
Kierkegaard, there are three themes worthy of attention: the nature of faith, the God-world relation, and the relation of law and gospel.

Bloesch applauds Kierkegaard’s reaction to the Hegelian notion of faith. He notes, “Kierkegaard particularly reacted against the Hegelian distortion of Christianity as this was reflected in philosophical theology. Whereas liberal and philosophical theologians contended that the object of faith is the most universal, Kierkegaard maintained that it is the absolutely singular as this appears in history.”

This discussion is clearly being carried out in light of the distinction Lessing made between the necessary truths of reason and the accidental truths of history. Hegel is interpreted here as dealing only with the necessary truths of reason, “a cosmic process whereby the Absolute goes out of itself and then returns to itself.” Against Hegel, Bloesch and Kierkegaard argue that faith has to do with a particular historical event, the Incarnation, “Jesus Christ himself entering time.” Kierkegaard “cogently showed that Christianity understood as the entry of the living God into history demands the passionate response of faith.”

Over against Hegel, “For Kierkegaard the truth of faith is not only above reason but also against reason. It is an ‘objective uncertainty’ that can be held to only by the passion of inwardness. It requires a leap into the darkness of the unknown rather than rational supports; … truth is not an abstract doctrine or an intuitive apprehension but the transformative reality of the incarnate Word making contact with us in paradoxical encounter.”

Bloesch thinks Kierkegaard was right to place faith against reason rather strongly. Indeed, Bloesch repeatedly places theology and philosophy in almost absolute antithesis in his writings, philosophy being based on autonomous reason as it attempts to articulate the foundational themes that shape a cultural ethos, while theology is “the attempt to see all things in the light of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ.” And Bloesch repeatedly quotes Pascal to the effect that the God of the philosophers is not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Reason and faith, philosophy and theology, stand against each other so strongly because, “Prior to faith our reasoning is distorted by sin. We use our reason to rationalize our self-interest rather than come to the truth.”

Yet Bloesch cannot completely follow Kierkegaard’s leap of faith that makes faith contrary to evidence or reason. He claims faith is “a venture of trust based on evidence that faith itself provides. We do not believe without our reason, but we also do not believe on the basis of reason.” In this regard Bloesch quotes the Augustinian formula credo ut intelligam, I believe in order to understand. And Bloesch thinks true faith leads to certainty, not objective uncertainty. He claims, “the decision of faith is as important as the fact of revelation in giving us certainty of the truth of
faith. The revelation is not simply assented to but is existentially embraced as the truth or power of salvation. Certainty of truth becomes ours only in the act of decision and obedience by which the external truth becomes internalized in faith and life.”

A weakness in this discussion is that Kierkegaard seems to associate reason with Hegelian philosophy whereas Bloesch relates reason to all types of philosophy without clarifying what type of philosophy is in view. It may be that faith and reason stand in somewhat different relations, depending on what type of philosophy reason supposedly produces; this possibility is not mentioned by Bloesch.

Bloesch is generally quite positive regarding Kierkegaard’s concerns on the God-world relationship. He strongly affirms “an infinite qualitative distinction between God and humanity.” Bloesch comments, “Whereas traditional Christian faith has stoutly affirmed the reality of the living God who created both mind and matter, the modern trend is to treat one of these as the all-encompassing reality, thereby making it tantamount to God.” Bloesch thinks Kierkegaard was right to reject the strong immanentism of the theologians influenced by Hegel because this tends to blur the distinction between God and creation. Yet Bloesch thinks Kierkegaard struggled with two irreconcilable views of God in his own mind. On the one hand, Kierkegaard affirmed the biblical picture of God who loves and cares for his people and is known in Christ. On the other hand, Kierkegaard also pictures God as “the impassible, self-contained Absolute, blithely towering above the world of temporality and materiality.”

It may be that Kierkegaard’s mind was divided between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, even while he rejected Hegelian notions of God.

A distinctive part of Bloesch’s dialogue with Kierkegaard has to do with the relationship between law and gospel, an important theme in Protestant theology since Martin Luther. Luther claimed that good theology must clearly distinguish law and gospel. The law has to do with the commands and demands of God; the gospel is the promise of salvation by faith in Christ. According to Luther, this means that one must experience the law of God in its condemning use, pointing out our sin, before one is ready to believe the gospel of forgiveness by faith in Christ. Kierkegaard follows Luther’s order of law and gospel in the way he puts the ethical and aesthetic stages of life prior to the religious stage, as well as in the way he analyzes the misery of life and the human predicament as a step to faith. In contrast to Kierkegaard, Bloesch follows Karl Barth, who insisted that the gospel comes before the law. This means there is a reversed relation between faith and such things as ethics, aesthetics, and existential analysis. Bloesch believes ethics, aesthetics, and existential analysis can only be done properly in light of faith and on the basis of faith. He claims,
“we cannot really know the extremity of our need until we are first awakened to faith by the love of God shown forth in Jesus Christ.” In contrast, “Kierkegaard allowed that the person in despair could have “a faint intimation of his or her existential need for God, though not a true understanding.”

This difference regarding law and gospel leads to very different theological assessments of daily life. Bloesch argues:

“Only as people of faith can we truly enjoy the pleasure of life. The aesthetic life is not to be left behind but to be appropriated anew in light of the free grace given us by God, which restores rather than annuls creation. Whereas Barth was firmly convinced that, despite human perfidy and obstinacy, culture could be transformed and renewed by divine grace, Kierkegaard came to the sobering conclusion that cultural pursuits had to be renounced in the interest of securing eternal happiness.”

To avoid misunderstanding, one should note that while Kierkegaard seems to have had a world renouncing spirituality, this was not true of Luther. For Luther, the assurance of faith led him to a vigorous involvement in the affairs of everyday life as the sphere in which one loves his neighbor. In Protestant theology and ethics, whether one engages or withdraws from culture and the enjoyment of daily life is influenced by more theological factors than only the relation between law and gospel. One might expect the reversal of the relation between law and gospel to gospel and law might lead Bloesch to an excessive optimism about the Christian life. But this is not the case. He quotes Kierkegaard, “the forgiveness of sins … does not mean to become a new man under happier circumstances, but to become a new man in the consoling assurance that the guilt is forgiven, even though the consequences of sin remain.” Bloesch adds, “We must repent of our virtues as well as our vices, because sin accompanies every good work, and yet have the full assurance that the perfect love of Christ covers the multitude of our sins.”

Francis Schaeffer

Francis Schaeffer was an American, though he spent much of his career in Switzerland. While emphasizing his interpretation of historic Protestant doctrine he developed a creative analysis of modern and post-modern culture. His theology was heavily influenced by the “Old Princeton Theology” of Charles Hodge and B.B. Warfield, with some influence from the “Amsterdam Theology” of Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck. His method of cultural analysis was inspired by J. Gresham Machen.

Schaeffer’s approach to Kierkegaard is very different from that of either Bloesch or Thielicke. This is for two reasons: first, Schaeffer deals with Kierkegaard primarily in his works of cultural analysis, not philosophical or theological works; and second, Schaeff-
fer interacts mostly with Kierkegaardianism as a cultural force that picked up themes and phrases from Kierkegaard, which may or may not accurately reflect Kierkegaard’s intentions. In his early works Schaeffer was not always clear that he was describing Kierkegaardianism, not necessarily Kierkegaard per se. Later Schaeffer made the distinction very clear. His definitions communicate much of what concerned him.

“There can and will be continuing discussion among scholars as to whether the secular and religious scholars who built on Kierkegaard did him justice. However, what in these can be called secular and religious Kierkegaardianism did bring to full tide the notion that reason will always lead to pessimism. That is, one must try to find optimistic answers in regard to meaning and values on an ‘upper level’ outside of reason. Through a ‘leap of faith’ one must try to find meaning without reason.”

Schaeffer describes Kierkegaard as the first man to live below the “line of despair.” He claims that the history of western philosophy has been a history of people trying to draw theoretical circles that would encompass a complete description of life and the world without having to depart from the traditional logic of antithesis. This effort has been “rationalistic,” which in his terms is not the opposite of empiricist but the opposite of theistic. Rationalistically people begin from themselves, using Man as the only reference and integration point, and attempted to develop a unified system of knowledge, meaning, and values. One thinker would follow after another and cross out a previous theoretical circle, saying, in effect, you can live in my circle, even though you cannot live in the previously drawn theoretical circles. This process was optimistic in the sense that thinking people generally expected someone to draw the perfect theoretical circle. But finally this optimism ran out.

“The philosophers came to the conclusion that they were not going to find a unified rationalistic circle that would contain all thought, and in which they could live. It was as though the rationalist suddenly realized that he was trapped in a large room with no doors and no windows, nothing but complete darkness. From the middle of the room he would feel his way to the walls and begin to look for an exit. He would go round the circumference, and then the terrifying truth would dawn on him that there was no exit, no exit at all!”

With this obvious allusion to Sartre, in terms that echo Plato’s Parable of the Cave, Schaeffer describes the end of optimistic rationalism. At this point thought and culture could go in different directions. One option would be to give up on autonomous rationalism and go outside of the self to find satisfactory answers for life. This would involve accepting the possibility or need for divine revelation. A second option would be to live with consistent nihilism. The third option, predominantly chosen by modern culture, would have been
unthinkable to previous generations: a split field of knowledge. Thought and culture crossed the “line of despair,” which is a historical line, after which western people strongly tend to split “knowledge” into two parts, pessimistic, materialistic rationality in which man is seen as a meaningless machine, separated from the realm of optimistic irrationality, in which people try to find hope, meaning, or personality. According to people who live below the line of despair, “on the basis of reason men will always come to pessimism—man is a machine and meaningless. Therefore, they developed a concept of nonreason, an attempt of man to achieve meaning and significance outside the framework of rationality.”

Schaeffer is very fond of some of Kierkegaard’s religious writings, but he is very critical of the philosophical framework that Kierkegaard brought into western thought. Schaeffer sees Kierkegaard as the father of many twentieth century cultural problems, especially because of his notion of the “leap of faith” that separates life into two levels, the level of rational pessimism and the level of irrational faith and optimism.

“One must understand that from the onset of Kierkegaardianism onward there has been a widespread concept of the dichotomy between reason and nonreason, with no interchange between them. The lower-story area of reason is totally isolated from the optimistic area of nonreason. The line which divides reason from nonreason is as impassable as a concrete wall thousands of feet thick, reinforced with barbed wire charged with 10,000 volts of electricity. There is no osmosis between the two parts. So modern man now lives in such a total dichotomy, wherein reason leads to despair. ‘Downstairs’ in the area of humanistic reason, man is a machine, man is meaningless. There are no values. And “upstairs” optimism about meaning and values is totally separated from reason.”

In Schaeffer’s works there are two closely related terms. The “line of despair” refers to this historical transition he connects to the influence of Kierkegaard. His term “existential methodology” refers to any system or method of thought that separates life and thought into two levels, pessimistic rationality and optimistic irrationality. And he thinks that after Kierkegaard started working below the line of despair, the existential methodology gradually spread to other areas of learning, the order being roughly philosophy to art to music to general culture to theology.

Even much of twentieth century Protestant theology has lived below the line of despair, using an existential methodology, e.g., Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Though a historical transition of this magnitude cannot be dated precisely, Schaeffer estimates that the slide under the line of despair should be dated at about 1890 in Europe and 1935 in North America. For Schaeffer, the relation between faith and reason is not just one among many
interesting theological or philosophical questions. He believes the Kierkegaardian mistake is causing the shaking and shuttering western civilization. God, human dignity, meaning, and universal morals are all seen as irrational in a society that prizes rationality.

The entire civilization is left without the intellectual foundation that Christianity once provided. While Christianity is clearly not derived from rationality, Schaeffer claims it is not irrational and gives “true truth” about God, man, morals, and meaning, not just irrational answers or existential truths.

Within Schaeffer’s cultural critique, though Kierkegaard may have been a Knight of Faith, he played a key role in the loss of the philosophical and moral foundations of civilization. If Schaeffer is right, the Knight of Faith may, paradoxically, have aided in the teleological suspension of the ethical for an entire society.

Schaeffer’s solution can be phrased in terms of his analysis of the narrative of Abraham’s almost sacrifice of Isaac, (Genesis 22) which was so important for Kierkegaard’s thought.

“In his thinking concerning Abraham, Kierkegaard did not read the Bible carefully enough. Before Abraham was asked to move toward the sacrifice of Isaac (which, of course, God did not allow to be consummated), he had much propositional revelation from God, he had seen God, God had fulfilled promises to him. In short, God’s words at this time were in the context of Abraham’s strong reasons for knowing that God both existed and was totally trustworthy.”

Clearly, Schaeffer thinks faith and rationality are somehow compatible.

**Helmut Thielicke**

Helmut Thielicke was a German Lutheran who was heavily influenced by Karl Barth as a young man, and like Barth he was involved in the Confessing Church that tried to resist Hitler during World War II. After the war he wrote extensively in theology and ethics, often claiming to follow Luther while arguing against Barth, even while there were many Barthian elements in his thought.

Thielicke claimed that “Kierkegaard has two right hands and no left hand.” This humorous statement, using terms borrowed from Luther, shows how Thielicke used and reacted to Kierkegaard in his theology and ethics. For Luther, the kingdom of the right hand had to do with one’s relation to God by faith, while the kingdom of the left hand had to do with God’s indirect reign in the world by means of the creation orders, especially the state. So Thielicke thinks Kierkegaard has something to offer in the realm of faith but little to say about ethics and society.

Paradoxically, a theme borrowed from Kierkegaard, that sin is “relating oneself absolutely to the relative,” becomes an important theme in Thielicke’s political ethics. He sees ideological tyranny as...
one of the worst political problems of the twentieth century. And within every ideology that tyrannizes there is a problem of idolatry, “a creaturely reality is illegitimately elevated to the rank of the creator.” In other words, an ideology results when people relate themselves absolutely to the relative, when they treat some part of creation as if it were the creator and interpret all of life in light of it. Further, a state becomes totalitarian when it not only promotes an ideology but also begins to treat itself as absolute, instead of as only one part of life. In Thielicke’s analysis, ideological tyranny is driven by multiple levels of relating absolutely to the relative. A key political effect of Christianity is to break some of this false absolutizing. Language borrowed from Kierkegaard describes this quite well.

A second key use Thielicke makes of a theme from Kierkegaard has to do with interpreting the image of God in human nature. Many theologians in the western tradition have had ontological definitions of the image of God that identified the image with some human quality, such as personality, freedom, responsibility, conscience, or perhaps with the possession of a soul. Against this tradition, Thielicke claimed the image is a relational notion, specifically having to do with a relation to God. Whether a person stands in a positive or a negative relation to God, “It is the divine address which constitutes the person as imago Dei.” God is speaking to all people, whether people respond in faith and have a positive relation or in unbelief and have a negative relation. It is the fact that every person stands in either a positive or negative relation to God that lends such dignity to human life. That is why Thielicke likes to call human dignity “alien,” not inherent or intrinsic. It has to do with something outside the person, a relationship, not something internal to the person.

In support of this notion Thielicke quotes a parable of Kierkegaard from Sickness Unto Death.

“This self acquires a quality or qualification in the fact that it is the self directly in the sight of God. This self is no longer the merely human self but is what I would call, … the theological self, the self directly in the sight of God. … A herdsman who (if this were possible) is a self only in the sight of cows is a very low self, and so also is a ruler who is a self in the sight of slaves—for in both cases the scale of measure is lacking. But what an infinite accent falls upon the self by getting God as a measure.”

Thielicke argues repeatedly that we must not see the value of a person as being merely derived from the functions or abilities of the person. Such a functional approach to the value of a person he sees as typical of totalitarian ideologies. Speaking in rather Kierkegaardian terms he declares that the value of a person is an alien dignity that comes because each person stands in some relation to God and is valued by God.

A third theme from Kierkegaard that Thielicke uses and develops is the distinction between Religion A and
Religion B found in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. The first, which Thielicke calls “the human possibility of religion,” carries a person “beyond the ethical but only in such a way that while he refers all the impulses and moments of his finite life to the absolute relation with God, he is also aware that he resists this relation and is unable to put it into effect. What he attains beyond the ethical is simply a deepening of his sense of guilt.”

The only presupposition of Religion A is “human nature in general.” Religion B is a “wholly other” that does not arise from human possibilities but is received from God as a pneumatic miracle. “The sense of sin is radicalized but certainty of forgiveness is also received.”

“...The individual is edified, not by finding the relation to God inside himself, but by relating himself to something outside himself.” Kierkegaard seems to be thinking in Lutheran terms here. Religion A has to do with the law of God while Religion B also trusts in the gospel of Christ.

This theological concern of Kierkegaard becomes central for Thielicke. He sees two types of religion and two types of theology. On the level of religious life he is concerned about the “difference between the reception of the salvation event into the consciousness and the opposing integration of ourselves into the salvation event.” At this point his concern seems to exactly follow Kierkegaard and is similar to common distinctions in Protestant thought such as that between religion as man’s search for God and faith as the response to God’s search for man (Barth) or types of religious commitment (George Forell) or even between law and gospel (Luther). But Thielicke further develops this distinction into two basic types of theology. Theology A (Cartesian) starts with some type of philosophical or anthropological pre-understanding and asks what type of truth from the Christian message can be appropriated by a self with this kind of consciousness. Great representatives of this type of theology include Lessing, Schleiermacher, and Bultmann. The problem, obviously, is that our human self-understanding may function as a screen or sieve that filters out parts of the Christian message.

Theology B (Non-Cartesian) starts with the Christian kerygma to which the theologian has been appropriated by the Holy Spirit, and philosophical or anthropological analysis is done in light of the Christian message and is only used out of love for the neighbor. It has a much different rank and function.

Thielicke himself provides a good example of Theology B. The 3,100 pages of his *Theologische Ethik* are an example of anthropological analysis carried out in light of the Christian message.

In spite of this obviously very large influence of Kierkegaard on Thielicke, Thielicke reserves the right to some very significant criticism of Kierkegaard. Even though Kierkegaard gives a solid basis for the value of the individual, he has serious difficulty giving a framework for evaluating social structures. Says Thielicke, “It is hard to see what
significance he could accord to the institutions, the historical structures (social and economic), in which the individual exists.” Along these lines he asks, “does not Kierkegaard bracket off the religious dimension from the totality of existence, so that it touches the horizontal dimension only as a tangent does a circle, i.e., at a single point?”

Kierkegaard’s notion of radical unconditionality toward God led to a negative relation to everything in this world, including the church and Christianity. This may be the background for Kierkegaard’s loss of immediacy for the normal things of everyday life, such as work and marriage.

In this regard Thielicke was quite critical of what he regarded as “anthropological docetism,” which, by analogy with heretical Christological docetism, regards humans almost as disembodied spirits that are hardly part of the real world of business, government, etc. Thielicke attempted to overcome this problem which he regarded as widespread by means of his sermons and ethics. A central goal of Thielicke was to provide a theological interpretation of the structures of daily life, in a sense rejecting major themes in Kierkegaard’s thought, for he saw Kierkegaard as a major source of anthropological docetism.

Finally, on an epistemological level, Kierkegaard’s notion that subjectivity is truth leads to certain problems. He “has no organ by which to detect the significance of factual knowledge.” Scientific and historical information can really have no place in his philosophy. The content of what one claims to know is dwarfed in its significance next to the passionate embrace of what one thinks is true. Though Thielicke did not use this phrase, he regards Kierkegaard as having a docetic epistemology.

Remarks

We see tremendous variety in the dialogue with Kierkegaard in Protestant theology that reveals the different concerns of the different theologians. Bloesch is a theologian in the narrower sense that his task is to articulate the contents of the evangelical faith in a credible manner. Schaeffer is especially an analyst of the shape of modern and postmodern culture as a whole. Thielicke is a theological ethicist trying to interpret human nature and the structures of human life. Yet certain common themes arise among the three. Bloesch and Schaeffer, in different ways, express concern that the Christian faith not be seen as irrational, even though the content of faith cannot be derived from reason. Bloesch, Schaeffer, and Thielicke all show, in dialogue with Kierkegaard, great concern about forms of thought that are antithetical to faith and the health of society. All three, again in debate with Kierkegaard, see philosophy as articulating the ideas and themes that characterize a cultural ethos and that need a theological response. All, using rather different theological justifications, see ethics,
cultural life, and existential analysis of the structures and problems of life as something that follows faith.

Certainly, dialogue with Kierkegaard has been valuable for Protestant theology in the twentieth century. And this dialogue may uncover some of what Barth discovered, something about the true crisis or judgment of modern religion and culture.

Annotations

1This essay was previous published in Commu- nio Viatorum (XLVI, 2004), Nr. 3, pp. 284–298, which is a journal of Charles University, Prague. Reprinted with permission. It was also previously published in Russian in Кьеркегор и современность (Minsk, 1996), which contains papers presented at a conference about the philosophy of Kierkegaard held at the European Humanities University in Minsk, Belarus.


3Ibid. p. 122.

4Ibid.


6Ibid. p. 39.

7Ibid. p. 58.

8Ibid.

9Ibid. p. 21.


11Ibid. p. 63.

12Ibid. p. 65.

13Ibid.


15Ibid. p. 51.


19FS 5. pp. 188, 189.

20FS 1. pp. 54.

21FS 1. pp. 15, 16.


24Ibid. p. 51.

25Ibid. p. 54.


27MFT. p. 487.
The Author

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